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bstract
ension funds, when they acquire common shares of companies in the capital markets, start to participate more actively in the decision-making of
oards of directors and, through their representatives, in the monitoring of managers. The aim of this study is to determine whether pension funds
re good monitors. This is done by identifying the influence of the control structure of pension funds over the financial performance and the market
alue of Brazilian public companies. Using dynamical models of linear and non-linear regressions estimated by GMM-Sys in an unbalanced panel
rom 1995 to 2015, it is shown that pension funds do not play a good monitoring role, as the control structure of these funds is negatively related to
he financial performance of a company or, in other words, the higher the stake, the worse the performance of the company. A possible reason for
his is that pension funds invest in the capital markets for portfolio diversification, are not concerned with specific decision-making in companies
nd have few monitoring skills, thus generating conflicts that go against the objective of maximizing the value of the company. Also, the study
dentifies the fact that investors give a higher value to the shares of firms in which domestic public funds have investments, even without proof that
uch funds improve the profitability of companies.
2018 Departamento de Administrac¸a˜o, Faculdade de Economia, Administrac¸a˜o e Contabilidade da Universidade de Sa˜o Paulo – FEA/USP.
ublished by Elsevier Editora Ltda. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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esumo
s fundos de pensão, ao adquirirem ac¸ões ordinárias de empresas no mercado de capitais, comec¸am a participar mais ativamente nas tomadas de
ecisão dos conselhos de administrac¸ão e no monitoramento dos gestores através de seus representantes. Devido a essa questão, o presente estudo
uscou verificar se os fundos de pensão são bons monitores através da identificac¸ão da influência da estrutura de controle destes no desempenho
nanceiro e no valor de mercado das empresas de capital aberto brasileiras. Utilizando modelos dinâmicos de regressões lineares e não lineares
últiplas, estimadas pelo GMM-Sys, em um painel não balanceado de 1995 a 2015, foi evidenciado que os fundos de pensão não desempenham um
om papel de monitoramento, já que a estrutura de controle destes fundos possui uma relac¸ão inversa com o resultado financeiro tanto interno quanto
e mercado, ou seja, quanto maior a participac¸ão acionária, menor é o desempenho das empresas. Esse resultado foi encontrado, possivelmente,
ois os fundos de pensão investem no mercado de capitais para diversificac¸ão de portfólio, não estando preocupados com tomadas de decisão
specíficas nas empresas, gerando, assim, falta de habilidades de monitoramento adequadas, provocando conflitos que vão contra o objetivo de
aximizac¸ão de valor das empresas. Também, foi identificado que os investidores valorizam as ac¸ões de firmas investidas por fundos públicos
omésticos, mesmo sem comprovac¸ão que tais fundos melhoram a rentabilidade das empresas.
2018 Departamento de Administrac¸a˜o, Faculdade de Economia, Administrac¸a˜o e Contabilidade da Universidade de Sa˜o Paulo – FEA/USP.ublicado por Elsevier Editora Ltda. Este e´ um artigo Open Access sob uma licenc¸a CC BY (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
alavras-chave: Fundos de Pensão; Desempenho; Estrutura de Controle∗ Corresponding author at: Rua Venâncio Aires, 1686 apto. 702, Centro, CEP: 970
∗∗ Corresponding author at: Rua Antônio Américo Vedoin, 409, Centro, CEP: 9719
E-mail: igorsonza@gmail.com (I.B. Sonza).
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rauspm.2017.06.003
080-2107/© 2018 Departamento de Administrac¸a˜o, Faculdade de Economia, Admin
y Elsevier Editora Ltda. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (htt10-002, Santa Maria, RS, Brazil.
5-000, Silveira Martins, RS, Brazil.
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ntroduction
When institutional investors acquire shares in companies in
he capital markets, they begin to participate more actively in
he decision-making of the boards of directors, through their
epresentatives. Institutional investors, such as mutual funds,
nvestment clubs, external funds, insurance companies and pen-
ion funds, are legal entities that invest in the stock market
McCahery, Sautner, & Starks, 2016). Corporate governance
urns out to be an important way for these investors to achieve the
eturn they desire, and many institutions are willing to engage
n shareholder activism, so much so that Aggarwal, Saffi, and
turgess (2015) have identified that the proxy voting process
romoted by these institutional investors is an important channel
or governance.
Pension funds are large institutional investors in the capi-
al markets. The greater the shareholding participation of these
unds, the more they are concerned about monitoring the man-
gers of the companies in which they hold shares (Punsuvo,
arros, & Kayo, 2007). Pension funds have a significant
arket share in the overall portfolio (Blake, Rossi, Timmer-
ann, Tonks, & Wermers, 2013). Specifically, the importance
f pension funds in Brazil in recent times has been largely
ecause of their accumulated large resources, which total around
$ 250 billion. This significant amount has aroused a great
eal of interest in several decision-making arenas, especially
hose dealing with public policy, the financial markets and the
apital markets (Gomes & Cresto, 2010; Varga & Wengert,
011).
Actively managed funds control a large share of company’s
quity and play a crucial role in determining share prices (Chen,
ong, Jiang, & Kubik, 2013). Lazzarini (2007) reaffirms this
mportance, arguing that, in spite of the great ownership restruc-
uring that has occurred in recent decades and has facilitated
rivatizations and the inflow of foreign capital, in Brazil this
ituation have further reinforced the position of local owners,
specially the State and federal pension funds in the capital mar-
ets. Harris, Jenkinson, and Kaplan (2014) argue that there has
lso been a large increase in the number and size of private equity
unds.
The fact that pension funds acquire the common shares of
ublicly traded companies enables them to participate more
ctively, through their representatives, in the activities of the
oard of directors, because they have an interest in the develop-
ent of the company and in increasing the value of their shares.
s the directors are the most significant and active monitors
sed by companies to avoid any problems with the expropri-
tion of minority shareholders, pension funds, once they have
oard representatives, also end up playing this role (Hartzell &
tarks, 2003).
Effective monitoring by large stakeholder groups, repre-
ented by administrative advisors, is an important mechanism of
orporate governance in publicly traded companies (Dasgupta
Piacentino, 2015). However, the importance of pension funds
as grown over time, and their influence in monitoring corpo-
ate behaviour is still poorly understood in Brazil. The following
uestion persists: “What is the influence of the control structure
s
a
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f pension funds on the financial performance and market value
f publicly traded Brazilian companies?”
On the basis of these assumptions, the objective of this study
s to identify whether pension funds are good monitors, and to
o this by analysing the influence of their control structure on
he financial performance and market value of publicly traded
razilian companies. First, the other components of the article
re presented, starting with a review of the concepts related to
ontrol structure and pension funds. This is followed by the
ethodological aspects and the results achieved, and finally, the
onclusions and the contributions of the study are identified.
ontrol structure of pension funds: concepts and
ypotheses
The construction of the corporate governance system in a
ompany requires the various contractual relations existing in
he entity to be balanced against the relationship between the
wner and the manager; a failure to observe these tensions can
ave an impact on the development and implementation of the
echanisms of control (Christopher, 2010). Pension funds, by
cquiring part of the control of the company, become part of
hese relationships, which may have an impact on the perfor-
ance of the company. In this context, this section is subdivided
nto two parts: (i) corporate governance, ownership structure
nd control structure; and (ii) pension funds as a monitoring
echanism.
orporate governance, ownership structure and control
tructure
Discussions about ownership structure began with the work
f Berle and Means (1932), who showed that the distribution
f capital is one of the main mechanisms of governance. For
unsuvo, Barros, and Kayo (2007), corporate governance is a
ay of reducing the conflicts of interest generated by the sepa-
ation of ownership and control, and, for Jensen and Meckling
1976), it is a set of internal and external mechanisms of incen-
ive and control that aim to minimize the costs arising from the
gency problem. For Shleifer and Vishny (1986), corporate gov-
rnance is a way of ensuring return on investment, reducing the
nefficiency of resource allocation, and encouraging investors
o increase their stakes in the company, through transparency in
udited financial reporting and through the collegiate function-
ng of control and accountability (Brennan & Soloman, 2008).
The legal regime in a country is important if one is to
nderstand the conflicts of interests existing in its companies.
o clarify this question, La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer,
nd Vishny (1998) classified four different types of laws
egarding the legal protection of shareholders that significantly
nfluence the ownership and control structure. Countries with a
ommon law regime (such as the United States and the United
ingdom) have more protection for minority shareholders,tyle (such as Brazil, Belgium and France), German-style (such
s Japan, Germany and Austria) and Scandinavian-style (such
s Denmark, Finland and Switzerland) civil law have less
1 anag
p
m
h
L
h
c
t
H
n
t
&
c
t
c
m
S
t
c
a
i
s
m
b
U
p
a
P
a
i
(
m
a
p
p
p
o
f
m
u
i
i
a
e
c
i
t
a
t
t
m
a
c
a
c
l
M
t
i
p
i
i
T
b
f
t
t
(
i
t
f
a
e
m
r
o
f
1
i
s
h
C
p
g
t
i
e
e
p
2
b
t
d
w
i
o
i
b
c
192 I.B. Sonza, A. Granzotto / RAUSP M
rotection for shareholders, facilitating the expropriation of
inority shareholders. As a result, these latter countries end up
aving smaller and less developed capital markets (La Porta,
opez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1997).
When there is strong legal protection for minority share-
olders, the main problems stem from agency conflict, making
ompanies with concentrated structures more efficient because
he need for monitoring is reduced (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).
owever, in countries where there is weak legal protection, the
ature of the conflict changes to the possibility of the expropria-
ion of minority shareholders by majority shareholders (Shleifer
Vishny, 1997). Silveira (2004) argued that, in the Brazilian
ontext, the second type of conflict is more pronounced, and
hat shareholders who hold most of the control tend to use their
apital and power to favour their own interests against what the
inority shareholders expect. This issue is evident in the work of
onza and Kloekner (2014), which indicated that a high concen-
ration of property may undermine the performance of Brazilian
ompanies because of this expropriation.
La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) have argued that, in the absence of
dequate protection for minorities, investors seek to protect their
nvestments by exercising direct control through large blocks of
tock. Following this idea, Becht and Mayer (2001) reported that
ore than 50% of European companies have a single shareholder
lock that commands the majority of shares. In contrast, in the
nited Kingdom and the United States fewer than 3% of com-
anies have these blocks. Concentrated ownership is, therefore,
response to the protection of inefficient investors.
ension funds as a monitoring mechanism
The monitoring of companies is done by several external
gents, such as advisers, auditors, large shareholders, creditors,
nvestment banks, rating agencies and institutional investors
Tirole, 2006). The directors, in principle, monitor the manage-
ent of the company on behalf of the shareholders. Their duties
re to define or approve the company’s major decisions and cor-
orate strategy: asset disposals, investments and acquisitions,
ublic offerings made by acquirers, changes in executive com-
ensation, supervision of risk management and auditing, among
thers (Tirole, 2006).
Tirole (2006) gives an understanding of the monitoring
unction by dividing it into active monitoring (interfering in
anagement in order to increase shareholder value) and spec-
lative monitoring (which is retrospective and is not aimed at
ncreasing company value). In the case of speculative monitor-
ng, Chen, Harford, and Lin (2015) have identified that financial
nalysts play an important role in governance in overseeing
xecutives’ behaviour. The market rates an expected increase in
onflicts after the loss of analysts’ coverage. For active monitor-
ng, Cornelli, Kominek, and Ljungqvist (2013) have verified that
he board of directors are active monitoring agents, generating
n improvement in the performance of the firm.As pension funds take control of companies, they begin to par-
icipate more actively in the decisions of the board of directors,
hrough their representatives. As directors have, as one of their
ain functions, the supervision of activities, pension funds can
8
t
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lso act as monitors. This activity is aimed at resolving existing
onflicts, including the expropriation of minority shareholders,
very common problem in Brazilian companies, whose main
haracteristic is the concentration of control as a result of the
egal regime in the country (Hartzell & Starks, 2003).
Emphasizing this issue related to expropriation, Iliev, Lins,
iller, and Roth (2015), by analysing the votes of institu-
ional investors (including pension funds) in director elections
n 42 countries, have identified that, in places with weak legal
rotection and poor disclosure of corporate information, these
nvestors show a propensity to vote against the directors, suggest-
ng a greater exercise of corporate governance through voting.
his fact suggests that the participation of these investors in the
oard may be an important mechanism for governance in Brazil.
Another aspect of corporate governance related to pension
unds is identified by Bird and Karolyi (2016), who found that
he greater the transparency of corporate information, the greater
he investment by these institutions. Aggarwal, Erel, and Starks
2015) have suggested that funds and their representatives take
nto account the opinion of beneficiaries and shareholders in
heir decisions, and that proxy votes serve as a public channel
or influencing corporate behaviour. In this context, Prado, Saffi,
nd Sturgess (2016) indicated that an increase in the control
xercised by pension funds limits the arbitrage in the capital
arkets.
Pension plan assets in Brazil grew significantly after their
egulation through Law no. 6,435 of 1977, which was repealed
nly in 2001 by Complementary Law no. 109 regulating the per-
ormance of pension funds. Three years later, in 2004, Law no.
1,053, dated 29 December 2004, was introduced. This came
nto effect in January 2005, making pension funds tax-free for
tock acquisitions (Article 5), even though the remaining share-
olders would continue to be taxed at 15% (Article 3). Recently,
omplementary Law no. 109 of 2001 was amended by Com-
lementary Law 388 of 2015, which aimed to improve the
overnance arrangements of private pension entities linked to
he Union, the States, the Federal District and the Municipal-
ties, the foundations, joint-stock companies and other public
ntities.
From the statistics of the Organization for Economic Coop-
ration and Development (OECD, 2016), it can be seen that
ension fund assets increased by 910.49% between 1995 and
016, from R$ 74.8 million to R$ 756 million. Pension funds can
e considered to be the main institutional investors of the coun-
ry, playing an important role in the accumulation of long-term
omestic savings. The relationship between pension fund net
orth and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) increased from 3.3%
n 1990 to 12.7% in 2016. For ABRAPP – Brazilian Association
f Closed Pension Entities (2016), this relationship shows the
mportance of the pension system, but the proportion can still
e considered relatively small when Brazil is compared to other
ountries (Netherlands 161.1%, Iceland 146.3%, Switzerland
25.6%, Australia 113.1%, United Kingdom 96.0% and USA
4.6%).
For this reason, there is a growing discussion about the role
hat pension funds can play in the Brazilian economy. It can con-
ribute, in Rabelo’s (1998) view, in three fundamental areas: (i)
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he financing of national economic development; (ii) the expan-
ion of domestic capital markets; and (iii) the democratization
f corporate capital (dissipation of ownership and control). On
he other hand, the growth of funds has the potential to transform
hese structures and fundamentally affect the depth of domestic
apital markets.
Because they are highly significant, pension funds are the
ocus of institutional monitoring studies, and many scholars
ave indicated that there is a positive relationship between own-
rship concentration and corporate performance. Along these
ines, Aggarwal, Erel, Ferreira, and Matos (2011) verified, in
n analysis covering 23 countries, that an increase in insti-
utional property influenced the improvement of governance.
rane, Michenaud, and Weston (2016) corroborate this, stating
hat firms in which institutional investors have greater control
ay more dividends, generating greater shareholder benefit. Del
uercio and Hawkins (1999) also found that pension funds are
uccessful in controlling and driving changes that take the tar-
et companies into account. However, Edmans (2009) cautioned
hat the effectiveness of activism depends on the threat of selling
tocks and leaving the company, which is greater for investors
ith larger fractions of ownership.
In the same vein, Ferreira and Matos (2008), in a study of the
ole of institutional investors (including pension funds) in 27
ountries, identified that the monitoring and activism of these
nvestors is very effective, improving the performance of firms.
ompanies that were owned by larger foreign and indepen-
ent institutions had greater market valuation, better operating
erformance and lower capital expenditures. According to
hese authors, these companies had more active monitoring,
oth direct monitoring (direct intervention by institutions) and
ndirect monitoring (the effect of institutions in the market’s
ssessment). Based on these assumptions, the following hypoth-
sis is formulated:
1. The greater the concentration of control of pension funds,
he greater the financial performance and the market value of
razilian companies.
However, the activism of pension funds does not always bring
ood results for the company, mainly for the following rea-
ons, which were pointed out by Becht, Franks, Mayer, and
ossi (2009): (i) pension funds, which generally own small
ractions of companies and have less voting power than other
nvestors, do not provide enough resources for activism by share-
olders, generating inadequate monitoring; (ii) the largest US
nstitutional investors have conflicts of interest, mainly because
ension funds are commonly sources of disputes between trade
nions and companies; and (iii) the US regulatory system limits
hareholder control rules, and there are great legal obstacles
or nominating and electing directors, especially for smaller
hareholders.
The issue of the expropriation of minority shareholders may
e exacerbated by the increased participation of these funds in
he ownership of companies. Along these lines, Giannetti and
aeven (2009) found that when a public pension fund acquires a
take in a company in the capital markets, the value of a marginal
ote increases, and controlling shareholders further strengthen
a
f
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heir control blocks. Using this increased strength, these share-
olders try to exploit their position or persuade pension funds
o follow their decisions in order to increase their voting power,
reating a negative bias for the company.
Since pension funds do not have great skills in strategic
ecision-making on the board, they tend to hire specialized
onsultancy firms, but their effective role is quite controver-
ial. Malenko and Shen (2016) have identified that the influence
f these consultancy firms on the vote decisions of these funds
n the board meetings is quite high, both for companies that
ave a concentrated control structure and those that have a dis-
ersed structure. In analysing whether funds are active voters,
liev and Lowry (2015) identified that they are more prone to fol-
ow the recommendations of a specialized consultancy company
hen they vote in a board meeting. The few funds that are most
ngaged in the voting process and do not use consultancy ser-
ices have a more significant return on this activity, generating
reater shareholder value.
According to Smith (1996), only a minority of studies have
ound evidence that institutional owners (including pension
unds) increase shareholder value through company monitoring.
ahal (1996) and Gillan and Starks (2000) reported that insti-
utional owners are largely ineffective as monitors. Carleton,
elson, and Weisbach (1998) and Woidtke (2002) have stated
hat there is a deterioration in company performance because
uch firms do not have adequate monitoring skills, leading to
onflicts that go against a firm’s goal of maximizing value. In
his same vein, Harris et al. (2014) concluded that the perfor-
ance of companies is negatively related to share ownership
y pension funds. From the issues raised here, the following
lternative hypothesis is formulated:
1A. The greater the concentration of control of pension funds,
he lower the financial performance and market value of Brazil-
an companies.
ethodological aspects
In order to verify the influence of the control structure
f pension funds on the financial performance and market
alue of publicly traded Brazilian companies, a quantitative
nd exploratory–descriptive study is applied, with secondary
ata related to the control structure, balance sheet and income
tatement extracted from ECONOMATICA data base. The data
eferring to the different levels of governance are collected from
he website and through direct contact with the Memory Center
f the São Paulo Securities, Commodities and Futures Exchange
BM&FBovespa, 2016), and cover publicly traded Brazilian
ompanies for which some common shares belong to pension
unds (since these are stocks that give voting rights, which may
nfluence the decisions and performance of the company). The
ata are collected on an annual basis, between 1995 and 2015 (21
ears), and relate to 252 companies, giving 5002 observations.In the analysis of the data, dynamic models of multiple linear
nd non-linear regressions estimated by GMM-Sys are applied
or an unbalanced panel. In the application of panel data, a
iven sample of individuals is considered over time, allowing
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or multiple observations for each individual in the sample. For
ond (2002), a dynamic model (where the dependent variable
agged in a period is also considered as an explanatory variable
n the model) should be considered to avoid possible distortions
n the analysis, if the regressions present serial correlations of
he first order, as is the case in this study.
The Generalized Moment Method (GMM) offers a more effi-
ient structure for obtaining asymptotic estimators than other
ethods. In this case, there are two types of estimators that can
e used: GMM-Dif (in differences), developed by Arellano and
ond (1991), and GMM-Sys (systemic), developed by Blundell
nd Bond (1998). The difference lies in the moment conditions
f each estimator, which depends on the number of instruments
vailable in the analysis. GMM-Sys is chosen for this study
ecause this model accepts a set of available instruments and
llows more precise estimates, although the assumptions about
he initial conditions are more restrictive.
The regressions are estimated with linear and non-linear vari-
bles. In this second case, a possible quadratic relationship
where the main independent variable is squared) between the
ercentage of control exerted by the fund and the performance
r market value of the company is considered. Using the ideas of
lmeida, Campello, and Galvão (2010), the same explanatory
ariables, but now lagged, are used as instruments. Finally, Bond
2002) states that investigating the properties of the time series
s highly recommended when GMM estimators are used for
ynamic panel models. In this case, the efficiency gains allowed
y the homoscedasticity condition are reduced, and one can dis-
ense with the condition, because more robust assumptions are
ade (Mátyás, 1999).
The tests applied in the study are as follows: (i) Arellano
nd Bond (1991): to identify whether there is serial correlation
n the residuals; (ii) Correlation: to identify the existence of
ulticollinearity; (iii) Chi-square (χ2): to verify whether there
s an association between the variables; and (iv) Hansen (1982):
o verify whether there is over-identification of the instruments.
ecause the presence of outliers in the variables is identified,
hey are winsorized at 1%. The data are corrected according to
he IGP-DI, based on the year 2015, and the software used to run
he regressions is STATA-SE. Formula (1), as follows, is applied
n the study:
it = αi + Zitγ + Witδ +
n∑
i
EFindi +
n∑
t
EFtempt + εit (1)
where D represents the performance, α is the intercept, γ and
are the coefficients, Zit refers to the control structure of pension
unds, Wit are control variables, EFind represents the industrial
xed effects, EFtemp represents the temporal fixed effects, εit
epresents the error term, i indicates the company and t indi-
ates the time period. The dependent variables in the model are
ivided into two categories. The first includes internal profitabil-
ty indicators: (a) ROA (return on assets); and (b) ROE (return on
quity). The studies of Boubakri and Cosset (1998) and Gupta
2005) indicate that these profitability indices capture the finan-
ial situation of the company. The second category includes
arket indicators: (a) Tobin’s Q; and (b) market-to-book (MB).ement Journal 53 (2018) 190–201
he data referring to the final accounting period were consid-
red for the analysis. The descriptions and the formulas for the
ariables are presented in Table 1.
The main independent variable, which is related to the control
tructure of pension funds, is formulated as the number of shares
elonging to such funds divided by the total number of shares. As
nly owners of more than 5% of the shares actively participate in
he decisions of the board, companies for which pension funds
ontrol less than 5% of the shares are excluded from the sam-
le. The assumptions of this variable were explained in “Pension
unds as a monitoring mechanism” section with the construction
f the hypotheses. Regarding the control variables, the follow-
ng measures are inserted into the equation; the formulas and
ompositions of these variables are presented in Table 1:
(i) Ownership structure of the main shareholder and the
largest three and largest five shareholders. These variables
may have an ambiguous effect. According to Jensen and
Meckling (1976), the effect of ownership structure on per-
formance is positive because the greater the concentration
of ownership, the smaller the possibility of the company
having agency problems. In other hand, La Porta, Lopez-
De-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) and Sonza and Kloekner
(2014) have stated that when countries have weak legal
protection in relation to minority shareholders, as in the
case of Brazil, the more concentrated the ownership struc-
ture, the greater the possibility of expropriation of minority
shareholders, impairing the company performance.
(ii) Size (total assets, EBITDA and equity). Pedersen and
Thomsen (1997) showed that the larger the company size
(as measured by total assets and EBITDA), the more dis-
seminated its control structure, making its efficiency greater
too. Klapper and Love (2004) have, by contrast, identified
that size can have adverse effects on corporate performance
in terms of governance, since both large and small firms
have incentives to seek satisfactory results, to avoid agency
problems (large companies) or to pursue growth opportu-
nities (small companies).
iii) Leverage. Generally, more profitable companies are less
indebted. In this respect, Jensen and Warner (1988) and
Boubakri and Cosset (1998) suggest that, for firms seeking
a better financial result, there is a tendency to decrease their
leverage, because borrowing costs burden the company,
generating inefficiencies. Brick, Palia, and Wang (2006)
also found a negative relationship between leverage and
performance, suggesting that if firms are over-leveraged,
there is a propensity to increase their bankruptcy costs,
harming future prospects.
(iv) Tangibility. This variable is expected to be negatively
related to efficiency because, according to Pöyry and Maury
(2010), tangibility represents resources that are costly to
the company, generating a decrease in its results. Along
these same lines, Almeida and Campello (2007) stated
that the more fixed assets a firm has, the greater the guar-
antees it must give to obtain financing, generating more
indebtedness. This issue may adversely affect the financial
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Table 1
Description of variables.
Dependent variables
Internal variables Formula Market variables Formula
ROA – return on assets ROA = operating incometotal assets Tobin’s Qa Q = (MVE+PS+D)total assets
ROE – return on equity ROE = net profit
equity MB – market-to-book
a MB = (MVE+PS+D)
equity
Independent and Control Variables
Variable Formula/description Authors Signal
FP – pension funds Total percentage of common shares
belonging to pension funds that each hold
above 5%.
Del Guercio and
Hawkins (1999),
Aggarwal et al.
(2011), Edmans
(2009)
+
Giannetti and Laeven
(2009), Gillan and
Starks (2000), Harris
et al. (2014)
−
AP – principal shareholder
TPA – three largest shareholders;
CPA – five largest shareholders
- Percentage of common shares owned by the
company’s largest shareholder.
- Total percentage of common shares of the
company’s three largest shareholders.
- Total percentage of common shares of the
company’s five largest shareholders.
Jensen and Meckling
(1976)
+
Silveira (2004), Sonza
and Kloekner (2014),
La Porta et al. (1997,
1998)
−
Tang – tangibility of the assetsb Tang =
CH+0.715×R+0.547×I+0.535×PPE
TA
Pöyry and Maury
(2010), Almeida and
Campello (2007)
−
Size:
AT – total assets;
PL – equity;
EBITDA.
- Logarithm of the company’s total assets;
- Logarithm of the company’s equity;
- Logarithm of profits before interest, taxes,
depreciation and amortization.
Pedersen and
Thomsen (1997)
+
Klapper and Love
(2004)
−
AL – leverage AL =(
Current liabilities+Non-current liabilities
Equity
) Jensen and Warner
(1988), Boubakri and
Cosset (1998), Brick
et al. (2006)
−
Law05 – Law 11,053 of
December 29, 2004.
Dummy: 1 – Period of
validity of the law
(2005–2015); 0 – Years prior
to 2005.
Colombo and
Caldeira (2016)
+
FE – foreign pension funds Dummy: 1 – If the pension
funds that have control
structure are foreign; 0 – OWc
Giannetti et al. (2015) +
FU – state-owned pension funds Dummy: 1 – If the pension
funds that have control
structure are state-owned; 0 –
OWc
Becht et al. (2009) −
IGC – Corporate Governance Index Dummy: 1 – If the company participates in
the Corporate Governance Index; 0 – OWc
Almeida, Santos, et al.
(2010)
+
Ferreira (2012),
Macedo and Corrar
(2012)
−
a MVE, stock price of the firm multiplied by the number of outstanding common shares; PS, settlement value of the outstanding preferred shares; D, total debt
(current liabilities minus current assets plus inventories and long-term debt) (calculation suggested by Chung and Pruitt (1994)).
quipmb CH, cash holdings; R, receivables; I, inventories; PPE, property, plant and e
c OW, otherwise.
performance of a company, since, as was mentioned in the
previous item, leverage and results are inversely related.
(v) Law05. This is a dummy referring to Law no. 11,053,
dated December 29, 2004, which began to take effect in
January 2005. This law meant, according to Colombo and
Caldeira (2016), that pension funds became exempt froment; TA, total assets (calculation suggested by Almeida and Campello (2007)).
taxes for the acquisition of shares, although the remain-
ing shareholders continued to be taxed at 15%. This legal
change created a natural experiment in the Brazilian capital
markets, generating a significant causal effect for pension
fund investments in publicly traded companies, which, as
a consequence, positively affects the results of these firms.
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vi) Participation of foreign funds. Generally, the presence of
funds from other countries generates an increase in value for
companies. In this context, Giannetti, Liao, and Yu (2015)
contribute to the literature related to the effects of board
skills on company results, describing directors with interna-
tional experience conveying the knowledge acquired from
this experience, and generating efficiency gains by improv-
ing monitoring in the emerging markets, suggesting the idea
that the participation of foreign funds can be beneficial to
Brazilian companies.
vii) Participation of state-owned funds. Differences in the com-
pensation structures for private and state-owned pension
funds imply potential differences in the incentives to mon-
itor companies that are partly owned by these investors
(Karpoff, Lee, & Vendrzyk, 1999). This is mainly due to
the fact that public funds are influenced by politicians,
who are elected by people who do not necessarily have
the same interests as the beneficiaries of the funds, indicat-
ing that the participation of public funds can jeopardize the
performance of a company (Becht et al., 2009).
iii) Participation in the governance index. The impact in the
capital markets of the companies’ participation at differ-
entiated levels of governance is dubious. Almeida, Santos,
Ferreira, and Torres (2010) affirm that participation in this
index brings substantial benefits to companies, especially
in terms of transparency, positively affecting their financial
returns. Ferreira (2012) and Macedo and Corrar (2012) did
not identify superior results for companies with good corpo-
rate governance practices, casting doubt on the importance
of this index in increasing company performance.
ix) Temporal and industrial fixed effects. To identify the indus-
trial fixed effects, dummies are used for each sectorial
classification of ECONOMATICA. Pedersen and Thom-
sen (1997) stated that firms in the same industry tend to
have similar ownership structures, and Morck, Shleifer, and
Vishny (1990) have shown that it is necessary to identify
efficiency according to the field of activity, indicating that
the quality of the business may be directly related to the
industrial environment in which it operates. Dummies for
each year of analysis are also added to identify whether spe-
cific events during this period have significant influences
on the study, and as a control to prevent these events from
distorting the results.
nalysis of results
As reflected in the literature review and the construction of
he hypotheses, private pension entities began to be more com-
on in the Brazilian market during the period of study, mainly
ecause of the increased resources accumulated by them, their
cquisition of assets and their participation in the decisions of
ompanies through the acquisition of common shares. This has
aised the question of the effectiveness of their intervention in
nancial results. To study this issue, the descriptive statistics and
orrelations, as well as the linear and non-linear analyses of the
e
I
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elationship between the control structure of the pension funds
nd the company performance, are presented.
escriptive statistics and correlation
As laid out in the methodology, before starting the analysis
he variables are tested for correlation and the data are checked
or consistency using the descriptive statistics. As expected, a
trong correlation (above 0.7) is identified between the variables
P (principal shareholder), TPA (three largest shareholders)
nd CPA (five largest shareholders), between return on assets
ROA) and return on equity (ROE), between EBITDA (earnings
efore interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization) and PL
equity) and between the Tobin’s Q and MB (market-to-book).
o avoid multicollinearity problems, none of these variables with
igh correlations is used in the same regression. Afterwards, the
escriptive statistics are analysed.
As shown in Table 2, after the application of the winsoriza-
ion of 1%, the variables related to the ownership and control
tructures show very close averages and medians. On average,
ension funds have 19.41% of the control of the companies
n the analysis, with the main shareholder and the three and
ve largest shareholders having, respectively, around 44.03%,
6.89% and 73.82% of the shares of the companies, evidenc-
ng a very high stock concentration; this is a common feature in
razilian companies, which are mostly owned by families.
The other control variables, with the exceptions of ROA and
angibility, show differences between their averages and medi-
ns, evidencing the need to use winsorization of 1%. Companies
enerally have a market value that exceeds their equity by 78%
MB), while their market value exceeds their total assets by, on
verage 3% (Tobin’s Q). In terms of leverage, for each R$ 1.00
f equity, these companies are indebted in the short and long
erm by around R$ 1.12. ROA and ROE have similar averages,
ndicating that around 6% of total assets are converted into oper-
ting income and 4% of equity is converted into income. The
ompanies have around 23% of tangible assets in relation to total
ssets.
Finally, with regard to size variables, the companies have, on
verage, EBITDA of around R$ 881.35 thousand, total assets of
$ 6.56 million and equity of R$ 7.27 million. These variables
how differences between their averages and medians, evidenc-
ng the need for winsorization. They also present fairly high
ariances and standard deviations, necessitating the application
f the Naperian logarithm. In the variables related to the con-
rol structure (with the exception of the principal shareholder
ariable) and those related to the internal performance (ROA
nd ROE), the asymmetric distribution is negative (the mean is
ower than the median); in the other variables, the asymmetric
istribution is positive. Looking at kurtosis, for the variables
elated to ownership structure (AP, TPA and CPA) and tangibil-
ty, the frequency curve is more open (platykurtic), while for the
ther variables, the frequency curve is more closed (leptokurtic).After the adjustments, the variables present consistent and
xpected patterns, with averages and medians near to each other.
n order to gain a better understanding of the evolution of the con-
rol structure of pension funds over time, Table 3 is presented. As
I.B. Sonza, A. Granzotto / RAUSP Management Journal 53 (2018) 190–201 197
Table 2
Descriptive statistics.
AP TPA CPA FPb MB ROA ROE Q Tang. AL ATa EBITDAa PLa
Obs. 3008 3014 3014 3006 5002 4580 5000 5002 4573 4598 5002 4381 5002
Aver. 44.03 66.89 73.82 19.41 1.78 0.06 0.04 1.03 0.23 1.12 6557.71 881.35 7275.04
p50 43.73 70.01 76.77 13.29 1.34 0.06 0.09 0.77 0.23 0.57 2513.47 168.05 1507.25
p10 14.03 34.38 46.41 3.05 0.42 −0.06 −0.14 0.13 0.00 0.04 588.38 −76.52 282.77
p25 24.05 51.10 59.16 6.77 0.79 0.01 0.01 0.4 0.03 0.19 1183.01 38.81 652.73
p75 58.41 85.04 89.87 23.90 2.38 0.12 0.19 1.41 0.38 1.26 8565.44 595.36 4224.26
p90 77.55 94.89 97.35 46.86 3.67 0.19 0.26 2.39 0.48 2.16 38,115.14 2234.77 20,392.31
Var. 526.66 495.74 392.53 376.83 2.10 0.01 0.14 0.82 0.04 4.74 9 × 1014 4.37 × 106 2.48 × 108
Min. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.06 −0.43 −2.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 48.95 −680.19 9.36
Max. 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 7.58 0.37 0.59 4.21 0.67 19.84 1.44 × 108 10,704.23 72,466.66
SD 22.95 22.27 19.81 19.41 1.45 0.12 0.37 0.91 0.19 2.18 3 × 107 2090.53 15,744.26
Asym. 0.37 −0.38 −0.72 2.25 1.42 −0.95 −4.41 1.67 0.32 6.01 4.36 3.48 3.24
Kurt. 2.35 2.25 2.92 8.88 4.77 6.73 26.88 6.05 1.88 46.80 20.04 15.28 13.00
Legend: AP, principal shareholder; TPA, three largest shareholders; CPA, five largest shareholders; FP, pension funds; MB, market-to-book; ROA, return on assets;
ROE, return on equity; Q, Tobin’s Q; Tang., tangibility; AL, leverage; AT, total assets; EBITDA, earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization; PL,
equity; p, percentiles; SD, standard deviation.
a In thousands.
b Excluding companies that did not have common shares belonging to pension funds.
Table 3
Percentages of control by pension funds in companies over time.
Yeara Obs. Average Median p10 p25 p75 p90 Variance Min. Max. SD Asym. kurt.
1997 25 35.91 32.93 7.62 11.17 49.00 74.71 811.54 5.21 100.00 28.49 1.03 3.52
1998 91 22.73 15.76 5.39 8.33 33.69 49.03 449.79 0.33 100.00 21.21 1.76 6.29
1999 136 22.23 14.82 5.41 8.33 32.18 49.00 423.85 1.65 99.99 20.59 1.81 6.43
2000 136 21.44 14.82 5.49 8.54 27.36 48.98 402.23 0.92 100.00 20.06 1.99 7.15
2001 134 22.27 15.14 5.51 10.06 29.48 49.00 407.45 0.92 100.00 20.19 2.00 7.18
2002 131 22.66 16.44 5.56 10.08 29.52 49.00 404.37 0.92 100.00 20.11 1.99 7.17
2003 136 22.85 15.20 5.75 10.07 27.67 49.00 417.94 5.08 100.00 20.44 2.01 7.08
2004 147 22.91 15.29 5.92 10.09 26.98 49.00 415.28 1.59 100.00 20.38 1.97 6.93
2005 148 22.49 14.90 5.92 10.07 26.29 49.00 425.25 1.59 100.00 20.62 1.94 6.77
2006 163 18.91 12.14 1.63 6.71 23.89 47.90 370.80 0.01 100.00 19.26 2.13 8.40
2007 214 19.37 13.92 1.67 6.51 25.38 46.81 352.03 0.01 100.00 18.76 1.96 8.15
2008 224 18.02 12.75 1.36 5.73 22.64 46.81 322.29 0.01 100.00 17.95 2.18 9.58
2009 232 17.61 13.93 1.80 8.33 22.54 39.02 273.87 0.01 100.00 16.55 2.52 12.16
2010 249 17.27 13.12 3.04 5.79 22.24 39.22 284.76 0.08 100.00 16.87 2.48 11.68
2011 256 17.47 11.79 2.47 5.80 21.15 39.22 372.50 0.08 100.00 19.30 2.70 11.47
2012 266 17.28 10.48 2.29 6.20 20.00 35.81 371.11 0.08 100.00 19.26 2.68 11.38
2013 265 16.13 10.06 2.29 5.37 19.74 33.11 342.21 0.48 100.00 18.50 2.80 12.26
2014 43 15.59 10.04 1.76 5.02 19.85 33.11 328.68 0.04 100.00 18.13 2.90 13.40
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a For 1995 there are only data for one company, and for 1996 there are no dat
an be seen, the percentage of shares owned by pension funds has
ecreased considerably over the years, which is evidence that,
lthough the assets of pension funds have increased and they
re considered the most important institutional investors in the
ountry, as discussed in “Pension funds as a monitoring mecha-
ism” section, the participation of these funds in the control of
ompanies has been decreasing over the period of study.
inear analysis of the relationship between control
tructure of pension funds and performanceTo examine the linear relationship between the control
tructure of the pension funds and company performance, the
nbalanced panel data method is applied by GMM-Sys. As
hown in Table 4, the Arellano and Bond (1991) test (Ar1
r
p
13.00 374.80 0.47 100.00 19.36 2.98 13.04
these years are not included in the table.
nd Ar2) indicates that the model rejects the null hypothesis
f no serial correlation in the first order residuals, and does not
eject a second order serial correlation. Thus, the model presents
erial correlation of first order, justifying the use of dynamic
MM-Sys. For the Hansen test (1982), the null hypothesis is
ot rejected, which is evidence that there are no specification
roblems in the instrumental variables. The instruments used
re the lagged independent variables, as suggested by Almeida,
ampello, et al. (2010). Finally, the Chi-square test (χ2) is
pplied, and the null hypothesis is rejected, indicating that there
s an association within the group of variables.
In general, the control structure of pension funds is negatively
elated to efficiency, both in the ROA and ROE and in the market
erformance (Tobin’s Q and MB) regressions. In the results, a
% increase in the control structure of pension funds causes a
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Table 4
Linear regression analysis on internal and market performance.
Variable ROA (1) ROE (2) Q (3) MB (4)
L1 0.20** −0.02 0.18 0.14
Z Test (2.16) (−0.23) (1.48) (1.42)
FP −0.02*** −0.03*** −0.66* −0.63*
Z Test (−4.50) (−5.38) (−1.65) (−1.67)
EP −0.06 −0.15 1.48 0.10
Z Test (−0.77) (−1.16) (0.70) (0.15)
Tang. 0.52* 1.01* 4.91** 2.71**
Z Test (1.79) (1.89) (2.11) (2.00)
AL −0.01 −0.09*** −0.10 −0.24
Z Test (−1.00) (−4.53) (−0.19) (−1.04)
Size 0.00 0.01 −0.22 −0.21
Z Test (0.72) (0.46) (−0.35) (−0.82)
Law05 0.11*** 0.19 0.70 0.01
Z Test (2.96) (1.61) (0.55) (0.04)
FU −0.04 −0.10 1.25*** 0.61***
Z Test (−0.73) (−0.95) (3.04) (2.90)
FE −0.06 −0.08 −3.91 −3.95
Z Test (−0.50) (−0.39) (−0.75) (−0.84)
IGC −0.04 −0.05 −0.37 −0.31*
Z Test (−1.56) (−1.03) (−1.07) (−1.72)
Const. −0.33 0.58 −30.10 −4.80
Z Test (−0.45) (0.28) (−0.23) (−0.09)
EF Temp. Yes Yes Yes Yes
EF Ind. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Chi2 783.94 1130.78 512.44 991.93
ρ-Value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Hansen 31.93 24.04 17.68 26.08
ρ-Value 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Ar1 −2.31 −1.71 −2.19 −1.74
ρ-Value 0.02 0.09 0.03 0.08
Ar2 0.68 0.84 −1.06 −0.90
ρ-Value 0.49 0.40 0.29 0.37
Legend: ROA, return on assets; ROE, return on equity; Q, Tobin’s Q; MB,
market-to-book; L1, dynamic variable (lag of the dependent variable); FP,
pension funds; EP, ownership structure of principal shareholder, three largest
shareholders or five largest shareholders; Tang., tangibility; AL, leverage; Size,
total assets, EBITDA or equity; FU, state-owned pension funds; FE, foreign
pension funds; IGC, Corporate Governance Index; Const., constant; EF Temp.,
temporal fixed effects; EF Ind., industrial fixed effects; Chi2, Chi-square test;
Hansen, Hansen test; Ar1 and Ar2, serial correlation of first and second order.
* Significant at 10%.
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relationship (where the main independent variable is squared)Significant at 5%.
** Significant at 1%.
ecrease in the return on assets of 0.02% and in the return on
quity of 0.03%, both at a level of significance of 1%. In terms
f market performance, the decrease in relation to Tobin’s Q is
.66% and in relation to MB is 0.63%, both at a significance
evel of 10%. This result corroborates those of Carleton et al.
1998) and Woidtke (2002), who infer that an increase in the
ontrol structure of pension funds generates a reduction in the
erformance of companies because the pension funds do not
ave adequate monitoring abilities, generating conflicts that go
gainst the objective of the maximization of value.
In terms of control variables, a negative relationship is found
etween the profitability of the companies and the ownership
tructure of the main shareholder. The logic is reversed when the
elationship with market performance is analysed, but in none of
he analyses is this variable significant (regressions with three
b
p
Aement Journal 53 (2018) 190–201
nd five shareholders were tested, but the results were quali-
atively similar). In all regressions, the tangibility of the assets
hows a positive and significant relationship with efficiency, with
1% increase in this variable generating an increase of 0.52%
n the return on assets and 1.01% in the return on equity, at a
evel of significance of 10%, and increases of 4.91% and 2.71%
n market return (Tobin’s Q and MB), at a level of significance
f 5%. This result contradicts the results of Pöyry and Maury
2010), who asserted that tangibility represents costly resources
or the company, generating a decrease in its results.
When analysing leverage, it is perceived that a 1% increase
n this variable decreases the return on equity by 0.09%, at a sig-
ificance level of 1%. In other regressions, this relationship is
ot significant. This result corroborates the results of Boubakri
nd Cosset (1998), who identified a downward trend in leverage
s efficiency increases, because an increase in indebtedness may
inder the efficient allocation of resources. With regard to Law
o
. 11,053/2004, which introduced reforms in the taxation of
ension plans related to capital market investments, this is pos-
tively and significantly related to the ROA, indicating that its
mplementation generated an increase of 0.11% in the return on
ssets, at a level of significance of 1%, corroborating the results
f Colombo and Caldeira (2016).
The variables related to size are not statistically significant.
n the other hand, the presence of public pension funds posi-
ively affects the market value of companies, with a 1% increase
n the participation of these funds generating an increase of
.25% in Tobin’s Q and 0.61% in MB, both at a significance
evel of 1%. Although this result does not match the results of
echt et al. (2009), it is important to consider that some of the
ost important pension funds in Brazil are public. The variable
elated to the company’s participation in the Governance Index
hows a negative and significant relationship with MB, with a
% increase in participation in this index generating a decrease
f 0.31% in the market value of the company, at a 10% level
f significance, corroborating the results of Ferreira (2012) and
acedo and Corrar (2012). The participation of foreign funds
s not significant in any analysis.
Finally, dummies are used for the industrial and temporal
xed effects in all the regressions, to take into account the sec-
orial particularities and conditions of each year covered in the
nalysis. The dynamic model is also presented, where the lagged
ependent variable is used as an explanatory variable. In this
ase, only the dynamic variable of regression 1 is significant,
hich is evidence that an increase in performance in one year
ositively influences the return on assets in the next period.
In what follows, the results are presented with a non-linear
elationship between the variables being considered.
on-linear analysis of the relationship between control
tructure of pension funds and performance
To check the consistency of the results, the possible quadraticetween the control percentage of the funds and the financial
erformance or the market value of the companies is analysed.
s can be seen in Table 5, the results are qualitatively similar
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Table 5
Non-linear regression analysis on domestic and market performance.
Variable ROA (1) ROE (2) Q (3) MB (4)
L1 0.20** −0.19* 0.18 0.14
Z Test (2.16) (−1.67) (1.47) (1.40)
FP2 −0.01*** −0.01** −0.17* −0.16*
Z Test (−4.59) (−2.16) (−1.63) (−1.70)
EP −0.06 −0.84*** 1.49 0.10
Z Test (−0.77) (−3.62) (0.71) (0.15)
Tang. 0.52* 0.70 4.91** 2.71**
Z Test (1.79) (1.33) (2.10) (2.00)
AL −0.01 −0.09*** −0.10 −0.25
Z Test (−1.00) (−3.12) (−0.19) (−1.05)
Size 0.00 0.31*** −0.22 −0.22
Z Test (0.72) (2.92) (−0.36) (−0.83)
Law05 0.11*** 0.18 −0.78 0.01
Z Test (2.95) (1.49) (−0.91) (0.04)
FU −0.04 0.12*** 1.25*** 0.61***
Z Test (−0.73) (2.97) (3.04) (2.90)
FE −0.06 0.21 −4.13 −4.13
Z Test (−0.51) (1.21) (−0.76) (−0.84)
IGC −0.04 −0.16 −0.37 −0.32*
Z Test (−1.56) (−1.56) (−1.07) (−1.72)
Const. 5.79 −2.29 −28.80 1.37
Z Test (0.51) (−0.22) (−0.22) (0.08)
EF Temp. Sim Sim Sim Sim
EF Ind. Sim Sim Sim Sim
Legend: ROA, return on assets; ROE, return on equity; Q, Tobin’s Q; MB,
market-to-book; L1, dynamic variable (lag of the dependent variable); FP2,
pension funds squared; EP, ownership structure of principal shareholder, three
largest shareholders or five largest shareholders; Tang., tangibility; AL, leverage;
Size, total assets, EBITDA or equity; FU, state-owned pension funds; FE, foreign
pension funds; IGC, Corporate Governance Index; Const., constant; EF Temp,
temporal fixed effects; EF Ind., industrial fixed effects.
* Significant at 10%.
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suggested by the study of Boubakri and Cosset (1998), shows anSignificant at 5%.
** Significant at 1%.
o those found in the linear analysis, but they have a smaller
agnitude: a 1% increase in the control structure decreases the
eturn on assets and the return on equity by 0.01%, at significance
evels of 1% and 5%, respectively, and the market performance
y 0.17% and 0.16%, both at a significance level of 10%.
In terms of control variables, the ownership structure of the
ain shareholder has a negative influence on the profitability
f companies, with a 1% increase in this variable generating a
.84% decrease in return on equity. This result corroborates the
esults of the studies of La Porta et al. (1999) and Sonza and
loekner (2014), who propose that this negative relationship
ound in Brazilian companies is due to the fact that, in countries
ith weak legal protection, a more concentrated structure can
enerate expropriation of minority shareholders, decreasing the
fficiency of the company.
As in the previous analysis, tangibility is positively and sig-
ificantly related to efficiency in regressions 1, 3 and 4, showing
hat a 1% increase in the company’s fixed assets in relation to
he total generates a 0.52% increase in ROA, at a significance
evel of 10%, and an increase of 4.91% and 2.71% in market
erformance (Tobin’s Q and MB), at a significance level of 5%.
everage is negative and significantly related to ROE, with a 1%
ncrease in this variable generating a 0.09% decrease in return
i
p
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n equity, at a significance level of 1%, corroborating the study
f Boubakri and Cosset (1998).
Size is positively related to performance, with a 1% increase
n total assets generating a 0.31% increase in return on equity, at
significance level of 1%, corroborating the results of Pedersen
nd Thomsen (1997) that were discussed in the methodol-
gy section. With respect to the dummy representing Law no.
1,053/2004, this was positively and significantly related to the
nternal performance of the companies: the results indicate that
he implementation of this law generated a 0.11% increase in
eturn on assets, at a level of significance of 1%. This result was
xpected because, according to Colombo and Caldeira (2016),
his law encouraged pension funds to invest more actively in the
apital markets, generating a greater return to companies.
The results related to the participation of state-owned funds
re similar to those found in the linear analysis, with a 1%
ncrease in their participation generating an increase of 0.12%
n ROE, 1.25% in Tobin’s Q and 0.61% in market-to-book, at
significance level of 1%. By contrast, the influence of foreign
unds is not significant in any analysis. Finally, the participation
n the Corporate Governance Index is negatively related to per-
ormance in all regressions, being significant only in regression
, as in the previous analysis. The dynamic variable is negative
nd significant at 5% in relation to ROA and positive and sig-
ificant at 10% in relation to ROE. The industrial and temporal
xed effects in this analysis are also considered. The conclu-
ions, contributions and limitations of the study are presented
elow.
onclusions, contributions and limitations of the study
The present article seeks to verify the influence of the control
tructure of pension funds on the performance of Brazilian pub-
ic companies. The results show that these funds are not good
onitors, since their control structure is negatively related to the
nternal and market performance of the companies. This leads to
rejection of hypothesis H1, but not the alternative hypothesis
H1A). These results corroborate those of Giannetti and Laeven
2009), Wahal (1996), Gillan and Starks (2000), Carleton et al.
1998), Woidtke (2002) and Harris et al. (2014). The conclusion
s that when pension funds invest in the capital markets, they
re not concerned with the specific decision-making of the com-
anies, and thus there is a lack of adequate monitoring skills,
rovoking conflicts that go against the objective of maximizing
he company’s value.
When variables related to the ownership structure of the main
hareholders are inserted, they are found to be negatively related
o the profitability of the companies in the non-linear regressions,
orroborating the findings of La Porta et al. (1999) and Sonza
nd Kloekner (2014). The size of the company is positively and
ignificantly related to profitability in the non-linear regressions,
howing that the larger the firm, more professional and efficient
t is (Pedersen & Thomsen, 1997). Leverage, as expected and asnverse relationship with the return on equity in the two analyses,
roviding evidence that the higher the profitability, the less these
ompanies seek indebtedness.
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As expected, Law no. 11,053/2004 encouraged pension funds
o invest more actively in the capital markets, generating a higher
eturn for companies that had participation from these institu-
ional investors (Colombo & Caldeira, 2016); this is shown in
he linear and non-linear regressions referring to the return on
ssets. The study also demonstrates that the fact that companies
articipate in the Corporate Governance Index in the capital mar-
ets does not generate an increase in market performance; this
as also shown by the findings of Ferreira (2012) and Macedo
nd Corrar (2012).
A few other issues have arisen in the course of the anal-
sis. Asset tangibility is positive and significant in most of
he results, showing that investment in tangible assets can be
eneficial to company performance, contrary to the findings of
öyry and Maury (2010). The fact that the state-owned pen-
ion funds invest in the companies generates a positive and
ignificant return, mainly in market performance, contrary to the
tudy of Becht et al. (2009), but a positive relationship between
tate-owned pension funds and financial performance (with the
xception of ROE in non-linear analysis) is not proved. It is
herefore possible that investors ascribe greater value to shares
n companies in which domestic public funds have investments,
ven though they have no evidence that such funds improve
he profitability of those companies. The participation of for-
ign funds does not significantly influence the results in any
nalysis.
This article has both theoretical and empirical contributions.
n theoretical terms, it provides a better understanding of the con-
epts of the control structure of pension funds, an issue that has
ot been very much explored in Brazil. The theoretical review
as shown that there is a controversy about the influence of the
ontrol structure of pension funds on the performance of com-
anies. In practical terms, dynamic models of multiple linear
nd non-linear regressions, estimated by GMM-Sys, are used
n an unbalanced panel of Brazilian companies from 1995 to
015 to estimate the influence of the control structure of pension
unds on performance, giving important results that help to clar-
fy issues related to the monitoring of publicly traded Brazilian
ompanies.
Some limitations that should be considered are the difficulty
f comparing these results with other studies carried out in
razil on the relationship between the control structure of pen-
ion funds and company performance, because research papers
n this topic are few and very sparse. Another constraint con-
erns the fact that the relationship between efficiency and control
tructure may be endogenous. Suggestions for future research
re the expansion of this study through a sectorial division, and
y obtaining a sample covering all institutional investors in the
razilian capital markets. Another suggestion would be to check
hether there is a relationship between the managers of private
unds and the advisers of companies.onﬂicts of interest
The authors declare no conflicts of interest.
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